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ROGERS V. EXXON RESEARCH & ENGINEERING CO.:
VALIDITY OF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES
AWARD UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967
Dr. Dillworth T. Rogers, a chemical engineer and researcher,
brought an action against his former employer, Exxon Research and
* Engineering Company,1 for unjustifiably forcing him into early retire-
ment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA). 2 The defendant had compelled Dr. Rogers, an employee
of nearly thirty years, to retire at age 60. Exxon's justification was
Rogers' alleged mental instability. The trial was bifurcated, and the
first issue before the jury was whether Exxon had retired Dr. Rogers
because it wanted to displace an older employee in order to grant
additional benefits to younger employees,3 or whether Dr. Rogers was
retired for a genuine medical disability.4 The jury unanimously found
for plaintiffs. Since counsel had stipulated that Dr. Rogers' out-of-
pocket compensatory damages were $30,000, 5 the only remaining issue
for the jury was an assessment of damages for the pain and suffering
inflicted on Dr. Rogers by Exxon's discriminatory action.0 The jury
returned a verdict in the amount of $750,000. 7 Plaintiffs then moved
that the court award attorneys' fees pursuant to Title 29 U.S.C. §§
626(b) and 216(b), and that the court double the total damages award
of 5780,000 pursuant to Title 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which provides
1. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975),
appeal argued, Nos. 76-1114, 76-1115 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 1976). Dr. Rogers lived ap-
proximately three and a half years after his involuntary retirement. 404 F. Supp. at
326. On June 11, 1973, his wife and daughter were named co-executrices of his estate
and were substituted as plaintiffs. Id. at 326. On June 14, 1974, the caption of the
case was changed to reflect the change in the defendant's name from Esso to Exxon.
id. at 326.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1975).
3. Brief for Appellee at 3, Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., Nos.
76-1114, 76-1115 (3d Cir., appeal argued Nov. 9, 1976).
4. 404 F. Supp. at 326.
5. These out-of-pocket damages are hereinafter referred to as the lost wages or
back pay award. They are based on the statutory language of 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1975). See text accompanying notes 32 & 36 infra.
6. After the jury returned its verdict on liability, the trial court permitted the
plaintiffs to show damages for pain and suffering. 404 F. Supp. at 327.
7. The jury verdicts are reported in 2 EMPL. PRAc. GumE (CCH) (New Develop-
ments) 1 5,311 (D.N.J. Feb. 4, 1975).
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for an additional award of liquidated damages, equal to the back pay
award, in cases of willful violation of the ADEA.8
Exxon moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in
the alternative, for a new trial. After extensive briefing and argument
on the motions, the court (1) granted the liquidated damages motion
with regard to the $30,000 back pay award, but refused to double the
$750,000 award for pain and suffering; (2) denied the motion for judg-
ment n.o.v.; and (3) denied the motion for a new trial, on the con-
dition that plaintiffs consent to a $550,000 remittitur.9 Plaintiffs agreed
to the remittitur and the court then awarded attorneys' fees of $65,000,
fixed by consent of counsel.10 Dr. Rogers' estate received judgment for
$260,000 plus interest and $65,000 for attorneys' fees, for a total award
of $325,000.
The crucial holding that damages for pain and suffering can be
recovered under the ADEA raises questions concerning the nature and
purpose of pain and suffering damages, compensatory damages, and the
statutory provision for liquidated damages. The purpose of this Note
is to suggest that the statutory remedies of the ADEA provide complete
compensation for plaintiffs such as Dr. Rogers, although they may not
be adequate in cases of non-willful age discrimination. The analysis
will begin with a discussion of the various theories upon which dam-
ages for pain and suffering are awarded. Next, the statutory provisions
of the ADEA and its congressional history will be analyzed. Finally,
the court's rationale will be examined in the context of the civil rights
statutes and cases upon which the Rogers court relied to support its
holding that damages for pain and suffering are recoverable under the
ADEA.
I. DAMAGES
There are three categories of circumstances under which damages
for pain and suffering are awarded. The oldest and, until recently,
8. See text accompanying notes 38-52 infra.
9. The court found the jury award of $750,000 excessive, although not the product
of corruption, prejudice or misconception of law. The court viewed the award as a
manifestation of the jury's outrage at the offensiveness of Exxon's illegal conduct. The$550,000 remittitur was influenced by plaintiffs' counsel's request that he be permitted
to suggest to the jury that $200,000 would be appropriate compensation for Dr. Rogers'
pain and suffering. While this request was denied, the court later ruled that the figure
represented the maximum verdict the jury could have awarded. 404 F. Supp. at 338.
The court gave no indication of what the liquidated award was expected to cover.
Id. at 335.
10. The court also charged costs to the defendant and, by consent of counsel,
awarded interest on the plaintiffs' judgment as of May 27, 1975. Id.
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most common requires physical impact, so that damages for pain and
suffering are awarded only upon a showing that mental injury occurred
as a result of actual bodily contact.1 Damages for pain and suffering
are also awarded in the absence of physical injury or economic loss
when the mental distress is occasioned by certain dignitary torts, such
as libel, slander, false imprisonment, malitious prosecution, and inva-
sion of privacy.12 Finally, under the relatively new tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the defendant is liable for reasonably
foreseeable emotional distress and resulting bodily harm caused by
his words or actions.1 The two major obstacles to a successful action
under this last theory are the difficulty of proving the injury and the
related difficulty of measuring the damages incurred.' 4
The historical assumption has been that damages for pain and
suffering are compensatory.' 5 Daniel B. Dobbs, whose treatise on rem-
edies is the first major work on this subject since 1935, analyzes the
nature of such damages in terms of why juries award them. Based on
his findings that the amounts awarded for pain and suffering are far
greater than any monies needed for painkillers or diversionary enter-
tainment, and that the pain and suffering is seldom inflicted intention-
ally, he states that these awards are neither strictly compensatory nor
wholly punitive. Dobbs concludes that the main function of awards
for pain and suffering is to provide prevailing plaintiffs with funds
with which to pay their attorneys. He points out that most pain and
suffering awards occur in negligence cases in which the plaintiffs lawyer
has been engaged on a contingent fee basis. If recovery in such actions
were limited to only direct monetary costs, payment of the attorney's
percentage would leave the victim without full recovery of his actual
losses. Since the jury has a relatively free hand in determining the
amount awarded for pain and suffering, it can set its verdict high
11. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971).
12. D. DOBBS, THE LAw oF REMEDIES §§ 3.2, 7.2, 7.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as DOBBS]; W. PROSSER, supra note 11, §§ 12, 54, 113 and cases cited therein.
13. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CsAIF. L. Rev. 40 (1956); W. PRossER,
supra note 11, §§ 12, 54 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser noted that the impact requirement
for pain and suffering awards has been overruled in recent years in New York and
Pennsylvania, both previously staunch supporters of the physical impact theory. Id. at
330-33.
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 12 at50 (4th ed. 1971).
15. DOBBS §§ 3.1, 8.1; Cf. O'CONNELL & SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN AND SUFFER-
ING: WHO WANTS WHAT, WHEN & WHY? 3-8 (1972). These discuss various non-
compensatory aspects of damages for pain and suffering. See also text accompanying
note 16 infra.
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enough to cover both a substantial attorney's fee and the plaintiff's
direct pecuniary losses.16 It should be acknowledged that pain and
suffering damages viewed in this way are still compensatory because
attorneys' fees are but another actual monetary loss incurred by an in-
jiured party as a result of defendant's conduct.
Strictly punitive damages, unlike compensatory damages, are as-
sessed primarily on the basis of the unreasonableness of the defendant's
conduct, without substantial regard to the actual injury sustained by
the plaintiff.17 The purpose of such awards is to punish the defendant
for his -wrongdoing and to deter similar conduct in the future. 8 Puni-
tive awards thus encourage private enforcement of public policy.
When damages for pain and suffering were infrequently awarded,
punitive damages also served to compensate plaintiffs for their indi-
rect losses, including attorneys' fees.' 9
As Dobbs notes, pain and suffering damages often contain a puni-
tive element. The economic value of suffering is very difficult to meas-
ure, and a jury can easily add to its damages verdict an amount really
intended to punish the defendant. The greater the amount awarded
for pain and suffering, the more the award appears to punish the de-
fendant rather than compensate the victim. Pain and suffering awards,
ds in Rogers, are often very high. Insofar as awards for pain and suffer-
ing can approximate the value of intangible yet real losses, they are
compensatory because they serve to restore an injured party to his
former position. However, there is a point at which these awards can
take on punitive characteristics, although it is impossible specifically to
define where this point occurs. In view of the jury's free hand in this
area, damages for pain and suffering may in fact be awarded to com-
16. DOBBS § 3.1 (1973). For a more traditional view of damages for pain and
suffering, see C. MCCORMICK, THE LAw OF DAMAGES §§ 88, 97 (1935); T. S.Do-
Wivcc, 1, 2 THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 43, 171, 462 (9th ed. rev. 1920); J.
SUTHERLAND, 1, 4 THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 95, 96, 1214, 1242 (4th ed. 1916); H.
Wmris, THE LAW oF DAMAGES §§ 21, 22 (1912).
17. Since most insurance agreements do not cover punitive liability, the courts,
when such awards are made, do take notice of the defendant's financial status. See
DOBBS § 3.9 (1973).
18. There are two good arguments against the imposition of punitive damages.
First, they are criminal sanctions by nature, but the defendant is not afforded the
rights coincident to a criminal trial. Also, if he is subsequently charged with a criminal
offense, he is subject to double jeopardy. See DOBBS § 3.9 (1973); authorities cited
note 19 infra.
19. Comment, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis,
60 CALnu. L. RaEv. 191, 203-18 (1972); Note, Implying Punitive Damages in Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 9 HIv. Crv. RIGHTS-Ci. Lm. L. Rav. 325, 335-37 (1974).
[Vol. 26
ROGERS v. EXXON
pensate for real but intangible injuries, to defray the injured party's
legal costs, and to punish the defendant.20 This conclusion conflicts
with the Rogers court's implicit assumption that damages for pain
and suffering cover only an injured party's mental or emotional non-
pecuniary losses. Under the broader view adopted here, separate rel
covery for pain and suffering may not be appropriate under the ADEA.
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967
The declared congressional purpose of the ADEA21 is to promote
employment of older persons on the basis of their ability, to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination, and to help employers and employees
deal with problems stemming from the impact of age on employment. 22
The Act prohibits age discrimination in hiring and discharging, and
in compensation or other terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment.23 It covers employers of twenty, or more persons, employment
agencies, and labor organizations,24 but protects workers only between
the ages of 40 and 65.25 The Act does not cover any bona fide seniority
system or employee benefit plan,26 and it permits establishment of age
as a bona fide occupational qualification (B.F.O.Q.) for certain occu-
pations.27
20. This is particularly true in cases where the total award exceeds the defendant's
insurance coverage.
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1975). For a detailed and critical analysis of the
ADEA's provisions, see Comment, Age Discrimination In Employment: Available Fed-
eral Relief, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PaoB. 281 (1975). The procedural requirements of
the Act are examined in Comment, Procedural Aspects of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 36 U. Prrr. L. REv. 914 (1975). See also Agatstein, The
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19 N.Y.L.F. 309 (1973);
Halgren, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 43 L.A.B. BULL. 361 (1968);
Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory Requirements and Re-
cent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. Rav. 227 (1974).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1975). The Act provides for education and research pro-
grams to effectuate its purpose. 29 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1975).
23. Id. § 623(a).
24. Id. § 623(a)-(c). See also id. § 630(b)-(e) (definitions of employers,
employment agencies and labor organizations that fall within the provisions of the Act).
25. Id. § 631. See also Note, Age Discrimination in Employment: The Prob-
lem of the Worker Over 65, 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 484 (1974); Note, Con-
stitutionality of Mandatory Retirement: Significance of Summary Affirmation of Weis-
brod v. Lynn (Memo 95 S. Ct. 1319), 9 CLEmuNGHOUSE REV. 311-15 (S. 1975). Both
notes emphasize the lack of protection under the ADEA for those past the age of 65
who remain able to work and desirous of employment.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1975).
27. 1d, § 623(f) (1). See Hodgson v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 6047 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 1972), which held that defendant's age require-
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Civil suit under the ADEA may be brought by either the Secre-
tary of Labor or the person aggrieved if the Secretary's efforts at con-
ciliation, conference, and persuasion have proved fruitless. 28 If the
Secretary commences an action to enforce an employee's statutory
rights, the aggrieved party loses his right to bring his own civil action. 2
The ADEA provides 0 that violations of its provisions are to be
treated as violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) S and in-
corporates the FLSA's remedial provisions with only slight modifica-
tions. Through the incorporation of the FLSA, the injured person is
entitled to (1) payment of lost wages or back pay;3 2 (2) an additional
amount, equal to back pay, as liquidated damages for willful viola-
tions;33 and (3) allowance of reasonable attorneys' fees and court
costs.O 4 The ADEA also requires employment, reinstatement, or pro-
motion, as appropriate.35 These remedies are available whether the
action is brought privately or by the Secretary.
In applying these remedies, the courts are in agreement that "back
pay" means the difference between the value of compensation to which
the individual would have been entitled had he been hired or retained,
and the value of the benefits he has actually received from subsequent
employment or insurance or retirement plans.36 In ADEA cases, at-
ments were a B.F.O.Q. because the safe operation of bus tours requires maximum re-
flex ability, which was shown to decrease after age 40. Accord, Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Aaron v. Davis, 12 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cases 1506 (E.D. Ark. May 28, 1976) (age not a B.F.O.Q. for firefighters).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1975) requires that within 180 days of the defendant's
allegedly unlawful action the aggrieved person give the Secretary notice of his intention
to institute a court claim. The Secretary then has 60 days in which to negotiate a
settlement to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice; no individual action may be
commenced during this period.
29. Id. § 626(c).
30. Id. § 626(b).
31. Id. §§ 201-219 (1976 Supp.).
32. The Act's exact language is "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime com-
pensation." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1975). See text accompanying note 36 inlra.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) Proviso (1975).
34. Id. § 216(b). Note that under section 217 injunctive relief is also available.
35. Id. § 626(b) Proviso, enforceable through id. § 217.
36. Back pay is a broad, make-whole concept which includes in the definition of
salary such specific benefits as increased pension rights, profit-sharing, and insurance
coverage. A back pay award is intended to restore the victim of age discrimination to
the same economic status s/he would have had were it not for the defendant's dis-
criminatory action. Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga.
1971), discussed these principles but held that the plaintiff's discriminatory discharge
occurred prior to the effective date of the Act. This case was relied on in Schulz v.
Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973), in which the court awarded
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torneys' fees are awarded on the basis of their explicit provision in the
FLSA.37
The courts have agreed that liquidated damages are not within
the province of the jury but are governed solely by the court's deter-
mination of whether the violation was willful.38 At first impression,
these damages clearly appear to be punitive, since the Act specifically
states that they can only be awarded for willful violations.8 9 The lim-
ited legislative history does not clarify the nature and purpose of liqui-
dated damages under the ADEA.40
A reading of the ADEA's legislative history41 reveals that Congress'
primary concern was to discourage generally the practice of age dis-
crimination rather than to ensure that every aggrieved party receives
full compensation for each injury he has suffered. In both houses, the
discussion primarily concerned the Act's provisions for educating em-
ployers about the value of older workers; the enforcement provisions
of the statute were not emphasized.42
back pay and required reinstatement. See also Brennan v. Ace Hardware Co., 495 F.2d
368 (8th Cir. 1974), which upheld the principle of back pay awards in an action by
the Secretary, but denied relief because the employees had successfully secured newjobs and the Secretary had failed to try adequately to negotiate a settlement.
37. See cases cited note 36 supra, each of which upheld the principle of awarding
attorneys' fees. In Schulz, $5,000 was awarded as reasonable attorneys' fees based on
the incorporation principle set out in Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp.
231 (N.D. Ga. 1971). It may be noted that in Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F.
Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970), the court stated, without any explanation or reference
to the FLSA, that the ADEA makes no provision for the imposition of attorneys' fees.
320 F. Supp. at 1181. This was dicta, however, because the court found no violation
of the Act.
38. See Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp. 660 (D. Ohio 1974);
Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1975). See Aaron v. Davis, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases
1506 (E.D. Ark. May 28, 1976), which awarded reinstatement and back pay but de-
nied "punitive" damages-that is, a liquidated award-because bad faith was not shown.
40. The most enlightening piece of legislative history is Senator Javits' comment
concerning a committee amendment which eliminated the criminal penalty provided for
in the original bill and substituted a double damages provision for willful violations.
113 CONG. Rac. 31,254 (1967). Yet when viewed in the context of the Senator's full
speech, with its emphasis on this bill's similarity to the FLSA, the question of whether
liquidated damages are punitive or compensatory under the ADEA cannot be answered
definitively.
41. 113 CONG. REo. 31,252-57 and 34,740-52 (1967).
42. See, for example, the remarks of Senator Yarborough, Floor Manager of the
Bill (S. 830), 113 CONG. Rac. 31,253 (1967), and Senator Javits' remarks at 31,524,
as well as the opening statement by Representative Perkins, id. at 34,740 (1967).
Representative Eilbery emphasized the personal costs to victims of age discrimination
and added:
[Tihis piece of legislation will help to focus attention upon a very serious
1976-77]
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The courts in ADEA cases have followed the Supreme Court's
holding that under the FLSA liquidated damages are not punitive, but
rather constitute compensation for damages too obscure and difficult
to prove other than by doubling actual damages. 43 However, this hold-
ing was handed down prior to the passage of the Portal-To-Portal Act
of 1947,44 which amended the FLSA to allow courts to award liquidated
damages on a discretionary rather than mandatory basis, depending on
evidence of the employer's good faith.4 Under the original language
of the FLSA, the courts held that once a violation was shown, the
plaintiff was automatically entitled to a liquidated award regardless
of the defendants good faith.46 It followed that such awards were com-
pensatory rather than punitive, since the employer's intent was irrele-
vant. The passage of the Portal-To-Portal Act of 194747 makes it at
problem. At the same time, the bill contains very real and effective tools with
which to launch new educational and persuasive programs designed to
eradicate discriminatory practices in employment. And, where these tools fail,
the bill provides machinery to enable governments and agencies to prevent
practices which cannot be otherwise overturned.
Id. at 34,745. Representative Daniels noted "that the bill takes into full consideration
the problem and interests of employers . . . . It [H.R. 13054] emphasizes education
and services and is not unduly coercive in intent or in fact." Id. at 34,746. Representa-
tive Olsen stated, "The major thrust of this legislation is designed to expand and pro-
mote educational and information programs." Id. at 34,746. Representative Dent em-
phasized that the essential purpose of the statute, promoting the employment of older
workers on the basis of their ability, would be done through an educational program
directed at employers. Id. at 34,747.
The legislative history also includes considerable discussion of the suffering caused
by age discrimination. Id. at 31,254, 34,742. The eloquent comments of Senator
Young were addressed to the issue of mandatory retirement, id. at 31,256, and he
noted, "though less dramatic-therefore less newsworthy-it [age discrimination] is as
insidious, as damaging, and as deplorable as racial or religious discrimination." Id. at
31,257. It may be noted that the Rogers court stressed this aspect of the legislative his-
tory to the exclusion of all else. 404 F. Supp. at 330 n.3.
While Congress was cognizant of the human suffering engendered by age dis-
crimination, the Act's history supports the view that the speeches on the consequences of
age discrimination were made to persuade the full body of the necessity of prohibiting
this form of employment discrimination rather than to imply that age discrimination
causes more severe personal suffering than any other form of employment bias. See
Brief for Nat'l. Ass'n. of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae at 8, Rogers v. Exxon Research &
Engineering Co., Nos. 76-1114, 76-1115 (3d Cir., appeal argued Nov. 9, 1976).
43. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945), rehearing denied,
325 U.S. 893 (1945), followed in Rogers v. Exxon, 404 F. Supp. at 335.
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1975).
45. Id. § 260.
46. Seneca Coal & Coke Co. v. Lofton, 136 F.2d 359 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 722 (1943); Rigopoulos v. Kervan, 140 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1943); Barrineau
v. Carolina Milling Co., 52 F. Supp. 197 (E.D.S.C. 1942).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1975).
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least arguable that liquidated awards are punitive.48 Nonetheless, the
courts adhere to the view that these awards are compensatory.49
In contract law, where the term originated, "liquidated damages"
means a "formula for fixing damages in the event of a breach ...
[and] is extremely helpful when damages from breach may involve
many intangible, remote or hard to prove elements, but where such
damages are nevertheless very real." 50 Liquidated damages clauses are
enforceable unless their terms are found unrealistically dispropor-
tionate to foreseeable losses and therefore penal in nature.51 Contractual
liquidated damages provisions can only be compensatory.
, The ADEA can be viewed as a statutory employment contract
which requires that employers covered by the Act not discriminate
against present or potential employees on the basis of age. In the event
the employer breaches his contractual duty, he will be liable at least
for the employee's actual losses. 2 If he breaches in knowing defiance
of the ADEA's terms, the injured employee may also recover for his
intangible losses pursuant to the congressional liquidated formula that
is part of the statutory contract.
Such a view minimizes, but does not eliminate, the punitive ele-
ment of ADEA liquidated damages, since it is the employer's conduct,
rather than his good or bad faith, that causes the individual's losses-
tangible and intangible. Thus a liquidated award is both compensatory
and punitive, compensating for mental injuries which are difficult to
prove, while punishing the employer for willful discriminatory acts.
So described, liquidated damages awards, in light of the ADEA's allow-
ance for reasonable attorneys' fees, are identical in nature to the awards
for pain and suffering discussed above.
General principles of damages, together with the provisions and
history of the Act, suggest the conclusion that awards for pain and
suffering are not warranted under the ADEA. Especially in cases of
48. Congress implied in its findings that mandatory liquidated awards are in fact
punitive. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (1975).
49. For example, in Snelling v. O.K. Service Garage, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 842
(E.D. Ky. 1970), the court held that liquidated damages should be granted only
where an oppressive employer is aware of the law, but refuses to comply with it. Al-
though the court refused to make such an award, it maintained that liquidated dam-
ages are compensatory in purpose.
50. DOBBS § 12.5, at 821 (1973). See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAw
OF CONTRACTS § 232 (1970).
51. DOBBS § 12.5 (1973); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 50, § 232
(1970).
52. Actual economic losses include attorneys' fees as well as all back pay benefits.
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willful violations, the damage remedies provided by the ADEA-
back pay, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees-not only are suffi-
cient to effectuate the Act's purposes, but also eliminate entirely any
rationale for awarding damages for pain and suffering. An analysis
of the rationale on which the Rogers court based its holding leads to a
similar conclusion.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN ROGERS
The Rogers holding that damages for pain and suffering are
recoverable under the ADEA is based largely on cases under the fed-
eral civil rights statutes,53 but the court does not detail the provisions
and remedies of these statutes. The court begins its opinion by relying
on dicta in Curtis v. Loether, 4 a housing discrimination case, to assert
that the ADEA creates a statutory tort for which common law tort
remedies are available. Housing discrimination cases, however, present
very different equities than do cases of discrimination in employment.
Actual damages in the former situation are minimal. Consequently,
damages for pain and suffering are necessary to effectuate the law.55
The Rogers court next relies on Bell v. Hood 6 for the principle that
"[w]here federally protected rights have been invaded . . . courts will
be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."5 7
Yet at issue in Bell were the fourth and fifth amendment rights to be
free from unlawful arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures.
Again, the plaintiff's economic loss was minimal. Moreover, Bell actu-
53. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1870 § 16, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970); Civil Rights
Act of 1866 §§ 1, 3, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1988 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1871
§ 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV 1974); Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3619 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
54. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). The issue in Loether was whether defendants had a
right to a trial by jury in a housing discrimination case.
55. See, e.g., Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973). Plaintiffs re-
covered, inter alia, $3,500 compensatory damages from the defendant real estate de-
veloper. The only injuries the court held proved were anxiety, embarrassment, and
humiliation. Claims for various pecuniary losses were found either speculative or un-
proven. 368 F. Supp. at 321. In McNeil v. P-N & S Inc., 372 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ca.
1973), claims for rent paid or equity lost were rejected as speculative under prevailing
authorities. However, plaintiffs recovered, inter alia, $2,500 general and compensatory
damages for humiliation and embarrassment. 372 F. Supp. at 661.
56. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
57. Id. at 684.
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ally held only that the federal courts have jurisdiction over a damages
claim predicated on the fourth and fifth amendments.58
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196459 is the civil rights en-
actment most analogous to the ADEA because it deals with employ-
ment discrimination based on race, sex, religion, or national origin.
Although the Rogers court's reference to Title VII suggests that it
provides for awards of damages for pain and suffering, Title VII plain-
tiffs are in fact awarded only reinstatement, with or without back
pay,60 and reasonable attorneys' fees.61 The court heavily relies on the
recent Supreme Court holding in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 2
for the proposition that Title VII is intended to be a "make-whole"
compensatory statute, but fails to mention that Albemarle involved
a back pay award-not damages for pain and suffering.6 The remedies
available under the ADEA-back pay, liquidated damages, and at-
torneys' fees-are never mentioned in the Rogers court's discussion
of damages for pain and suffering; it never considers whether the statu-
tory remedies might provide full relief.
Throughout its opinion, the court relies on out-of-context dicta, 64
scholarly articles advocating either punitive or compensatory damages
in discrimination cases, 5 an incomplete survey of the ADEA's legis-
58. Id. at 685.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1974).
60. Id. § 2000e-5(g) (1974).
61. Id. § 2000e-5(k) (1974).
62. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
63. Pain and suffering and punitive damages have almost always been denied in
title VII cases. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975);
Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Jiron v. Sperry
Rand Corp., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 730 (D. Utah 1975); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F.
Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). The sole exception to these cases is Humphrey v. S.W. Portland Cement
Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 992 (5th
Cir. 1974). The trial court awarded plaintiff $1,200 for what it termed "psychic in-
juries"; on appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to show that he was
denied a job promotion as a result of racial discrimination. The case was eventually
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Thus, the weight of authority supports
the principle that damages for pain and suffering are not available under title VII.
64. For example, Surrise v. Conwed Corp., 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975), is
cited to establish that the ADEA's remedial purpose should be liberally effectuated in
fashioning appropriate relief. Yet, this case airmed the trial court's judgment for the
employer on the finding that the plaintiff was dismissed because of poor work per-
formance, not age.
65. E.g., Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering In Discrimination Cases, 15 CLEv.-
MIAR. L. REv. 1 (1966); Comment, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimina-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 H}Inv. L. REv. 1109, 1259-69
(1971).
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lative history,66 and a wide range of discrimination cases in areas other
than employment. 6 7 The court further justifies its holding by lengthy
discussions of the effects of age discrimination and the suffering of Dr.
Rogers. These arguments may be relevant to congressional considera-
tion of amendment of the ADEA to provide for additional pain and
suffering recovery, but they are inapposite under the present act.
Perhaps the best argument for the court's conclusion is one which
the court does not emphasize. The ADEA's enforcement section pro-
vides that:
In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appro-
priate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without
limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or pro-
motion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this sec-
tion.68
But this language cannot be read in a vacuum. When this provision
is viewed in the light of its, legislative history, other employment cases,
and its own specified remedies, the language cannot support a recovery
for pain and suffering.
Moreover, to allow recovery for pain and suffering frustrates the
congressional goal of ending age discrimination through conciliation
and education, since the possibility of a large award will encourage
private action rather than settlement. And, since the Secretary is under
no obligation to seek damages for pain and suffering, employees whose
private actions are superseded by the Secretary might be denied full
recovery."'
CONCLUSION
The court in Rogers has introduced a new remedy for age dis-
crimination by relying on a superficial analysis of only remote author-
66. See note 42 supra.
67. For example, the court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, including Sexton
v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), afl'd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971);
Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F.
Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967), and on the housing cases cited in note 55 supra. Several
state cases involving housing discrimination were also referred to by the Rogers court.
See 404 F. Supp. at 332.
68. 26 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
69. Brief for Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae at 11, Rogers v. Exxon Re-
search & Engineering Co., Nos. 76-1114, 76-1115 (3d Cir., appeal argued Nov. 9,
1976).
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ity. It has not considered the purposes and functions of either the
ADEA's statutory remedies or damages for pain and suffering. The
court has effectively legislated a new remedy for violations of the
ADEA, rather than applying the statute's existing remedial provisions.
Because Rogers is currently on appeal to the third circuit, its final im-
pact is unclear.
CATHERINE G. NovACK
ADDENDUM
On January 20, 1977, Judge Weis filed the carefully reasoned
opinion of the Third Circuit in Rogers v. Exxon,70 holding that dam-
ages for pain and suffering may not be awarded under the ADEA.7 1
Judge Weis supported the holding with the following arguments: (1)
the only monetary relief expressly sanctioned by the Act is back pay
and liquidated damages; (2) the liquidated damages provision, which
penalizes a defendant who has not acted in good faith, functions in
much the same way as an award for pain and suffering, which usually
varies proportionately with the defendant's turpitude; (3) legal dam-
age awards rarely include compensation for mental distress, and thus
the ADEA's provision for "legal relief" does not by itself support an
award for pain and suffering under the Act; (4) the legistive history
of the ADEA gives no indication that Congress thought the remedies
specifically named might be inadequate to eliminate age discrimina-
tion; (5) settlement of claims administratively, which Congress clearly
wished to encourage, would be jeopardized by the introduction of an
element of damages difficult to compute with accuracy; and (6) the
prospect of a large jury award for pain and suffering would not en-
courage claimants to accept settlement before an administrative agency.
70. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., - F.2d -, 14 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 519 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 1977).
71. In addition, the Third Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings on
Exxon's claim that the plan under which Dr. Rogers was retired was exempt, under
section 623(f), from ADEA coverage. The Third Circuit thus has limited the coverage
of the Act itself, as well as the remedies it provides. Plaintiffs' brief on appeal gave
only scant attention to this issue. Defendants' brief was not made available to com-
mentators.
Under another Third Circuit case filed the same day, it seems likely that Exxon
will be able to prevail on this claim. See Zinger v. Blanchette, - F.2d - , 14
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 497 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 1977). If so, the plaintiffs will not be
able to obtain damages for the years after Dr. Rogers. turned sixty.
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The plaintiffs may try to obtain Supreme Court review. The trial
court's holding in Rogers already has been relied on by district courts
in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits to allow claims for pain and
suffering.72 If review is not granted now and a conflict among the
circuits develops, eventual Supreme Court review of the question is
probable.
C.G.N.
72. See Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., - F. Supp. - , 13 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1447, 1454 (N.D. IlI. Aug. 26, 1976); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc.,
- F. Supp. - , 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1455, 1460 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 8,
1976). Contra, Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., - F. Supp. -, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 854 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 1976), where the district court granted a motion to
strike the plaintiff's claim for damages for pain and suffering. The court stated that
the Rogers court's analogy to Title VII was misplaced, since the language 6T the
ADEA plainly limits dollar recovery to lost wages.
